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Abstract:  
There is growing interest in political inequality across income groups. We contribute to this 
debate with two arguments about political involvement: 1) poverty depresses internal 
political efficacy by undermining cognitive and emotional resources and 2) dissent in the 
party-system reduces the efficacy gap to higher incomes. Specifically, we expect conflict 
between anti-elite and mainstream parties to simplify political decisions and to stimulate 
political attention among poor voters. We support the arguments with comparative and 
experimental analyses. Comparative survey data shows that the income gap in efficacy varies 
with a novel measure of the anti-elite salience in the party system. The causal impact of anti-
elite rhetoric is established though a representative survey experiment. Finally, we investigate 
how these mechanisms affect both electoral and other forms of political participation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a growing interest among political scientists in the unequal participation and 
representation of poor voters. By now, there is solid evidence for two patterns that probably 
reinforce each other (Piven and Cloward 1988): relatively low turnout among poor voters and 
stronger responsiveness of political elites to the preferences of better-off citizens (Erikson 2015; 
Gilens and Page 2014; Rosset et al. 2013).  
These patterns have arguably been facilitated by and contributed to growing income inequality. 
If the (poorly represented) poor withdraw from politics, they diminish incentives to represent 
their interests in redistribution and anti-poverty policies (Avery 2015; Mahler 2008; Pontusson 
and Rueda 2010). The resulting social inequality could, in turn, alienate the poor even further 
(Iversen and Soskice 2015; Jensen and Jespersen 2017; Solt 2008). Although the causal 
relationship is complex, there should be little doubt by now that many Western democracies 
have experienced such a twin process of growing social inequality and political disaffection of 
(lower-class) citizens with political elites (Armingeon and Schädel 2015; Kuhn et al. 2016; 
Schäfer 2013). 
Against this background, our goal is to contribute to the rather limited knowledge about factors 
that are conducive to a better integration of poor citizens into politics. We do so by addressing 
what we see as two important gaps in the existing comparative literature on the political 
integration of the poor. First, this literature has paid limited attention to the factors that explain 
poor citizens’ lower involvement in the first place (Iversen and Soskice 2015). In particular, it 
has ignored contributions from psychology and behavioral economics on how cognitively and 
emotionally absorbing poverty is (Haushofer and Fehr 2014; Mani et al. 2013). Based on this 
literature, we argue that one (albeit certainly not the only) mechanism underlying the poor’s 
withdrawal from politics is that social problems impede the development of subjective political 
competence (or internal political efficacy). 
Second, while there is ample evidence that income gaps in political participation are magnified 
by social inequality, the literature has paid limited attention to how party system characteristics 
moderate the political inclusion of the poor (a recent exception is Anderson and Beramendi 
2012). Based on research about the effects of polarization on political behavior (Dalton 2008; 
Evans and Tilley 2012; Smidt 2017), our broad intuition is, as we elaborate below, that a diverse 
party landscape might be beneficial for poor voters’ political involvement. Given the recent 
growth of populist anti-elite parties that draw support disproportionately from lower classes 
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(Arzheimer 2009; Golder 2016; March and Rommerskirchen 2015), we are particularly 
interested in whether those parties’ radical opposition to the political establishment might help 
to strengthen poor voters’ sense of political efficacy. The bulk of previous research in this 
literature focuses on the characteristics of populist parties and their supporters (Akkermann et 
al. 2014; Golder 2016), while “not much is known about the way in which populist messages 
affect citizens’ attitudes” (Rooduijn et al. 2016: 34; see also Mudde 2013). Probably even less 
is known about how these messages affect (gaps in) citizens’ political engagement (Immerzeel 
and Pickup 2015). Hence, although we primarily address the literature on poor voters, our 
findings are relevant for populism research as well.  
Our theoretical argument therefore combines literatures on the psychology of poverty, 
polarization, and anti-elite populism and can be summarized as follows: the experience of 
poverty reduces citizens’ cognitive, emotional, and social resources, which in turn undermines 
their ability and motivation to acquire political information and to develop internal political 
efficacy. This mechanism is weaker in political systems characterized by intense anti-elite 
discourses, because such discourses clarify and simplify party differences, provide additional 
motivation to engage in politics, and facilitate mobilizing emotions. Although we are agnostic 
as to whether populists generally represent the poor in a ‘better’ way, we find it plausible that 
their anti-elite rhetoric contributes to a stimulating political environment that strengthens their 
sense of agency.  
We analyze the link between poverty, political efficacy and anti-elite rhetoric in two related 
studies that combine correlational and causal inference. First, we show with data from the 
European Social Survey (ESS) that the poor on average have lower political efficacy. This 
efficacy gap across income groups varies with a novel measure of the salience of anti-elite 
politics derived from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al. 2017). Second, we establish 
causality in a survey experiment in Germany (a country that only recently experienced intense 
anti-elite mobilization). In line with out theory, it shows that priming anti-elite rhetoric leads to 
a significant increase in internal efficacy, but only among low-income respondents. Finally, we 
return to the observational data from the ESS to analyze whether our findings for efficacy 
extend to political participation. The analysis reveals that this is the case for non-electoral forms 
of participation, but not for voting.  
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POVERTY AND POLITICAL EFFICACY 
For two non-exclusive reasons, poor citizens on average show lower political engagement than 
other income groups. First, they are disenchanted because of insufficient substantive and 
descriptive representation. As described above, there might be a vicious cycle of disengagement 
and neglect by elites. This would explain why income gaps in participation are positively 
correlated to income inequality (Solt 2008). In this explanation, the mechanism linking poverty 
and political (non) participation is depressed external political efficacy. 
Second, and less frequently reflected in comparative research, economic disadvantage also 
compromises internal efficacy, because it undermines the resources needed to engage with 
politics (Iversen and Soskice 2015). Internal efficacy is defined as confidence in one’s ability 
to understand and participate in politics. It is a strong predictor of different forms of 
participation and therefore an important aspect of political involvement (see Verba et al. 1995 
and work cited in Beaumont 2011). Mechanisms through which economic problems impair 
internal efficacy and its precedents have been discussed for the special case of the unemployed 
(Jahoda et al. 1972; Marx and Nguyen 2016; Rosenstone 1982). Here we would like elaborate 
how poverty more generally relates to internal efficacy.  
One scarce resource for the poor is time, because they often need to develop sophisticated 
strategies to cope with material hardship. Hence, the opportunity costs of acquiring political 
information should grow with exposure to social problems. As Hassell and Settle (forthcoming: 
4) put it “every minute spent engaging in politics is time not spent addressing other financial or 
personal problems.” Besides a shortage of time to acquire political information, social problems 
also trigger cognitive and emotional processes that are likely to impede the processing and 
retrieval of information. Recent research shows how poverty and efforts to cope with it 
contribute to depleting mental resources (Haushofer and Fehr 2014, Mani et al. 2013; Vohs 
2013). The underlying mechanisms are stress, a mentally exhausting exercise of self-regulation, 
and distraction through ruminating thoughts about material problems. These cognitive 
processes make it plausible that the poor have difficulties to translate (the already lower) 
exposure to political information into political knowledge, competence, and efficacy.  
Besides cognitive impairment, the poor typically also have to deal with intense negative 
emotions. Their material situation deprives them, in a fundamental way, of control over their 
lives. The resulting emotions of anxiety and helplessness translate into a depressed sense of 
agency (Fryer 1997; Gallo and Mathews 2003). In addition, the stigmatization of poverty can 
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undermine feelings of self-worth (Hall et al. 2013). In a nutshell, poverty can be highly stressful, 
distracting, frustrating, shameful, and disheartening. These psychological states are likely to 
spill over into a depressed sense of general efficacy as well as internal political efficacy (Marx 
and Nguyen 2016; Beaumont, 2011; Caprara et al. 2009). Without denying the relevance of 
insufficient representation, we focus on this understudied aspect and hence use internal political 
efficacy as our dependent variable. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Holding everything else constant, the poor have lower internal efficacy than 
middle and high income groups. 
Although poverty should depress political involvement everywhere, its precise effect should 
depend on the political context (Piven and Cloward 1988). Recent comparative studies on 
income gaps in political involvement tend to focus on socio-economic country variation, such 
as income inequality or welfare state generosity (Cicatiello et al. 2015; Jensen and Jespersen 
2017; Schäfer 2013; Solt 2008). We argue that party system characteristics should also 
moderate the link between poverty and engagement (see also Anderson and Beramendi 2012). 
In particular, we are interested in the role of (frequently populist) anti-elite parties1 at the left 
or right fringes of the political spectrum (Judis 2016; Polk et al. 2017; Rooduijn and Akkerman 
2017). 
CAN ANTI-ELITE RHETORIC DECREASE INCOME GAPS IN EFFICACY? 
How could anti-elite discourses contribute to restoring the depressed sense of internal political 
efficacy among the poor? We depart from the general notion that some elite dissent is important 
for democracies (Schattschneider 1960). In the words of Chantal Mouffe (2013: 204), a “vibrant 
clash of democratic political positions” provides a “terrain in which passions can be mobilized 
around democratic objectives”. By contrast, “[t]oo much emphasis on consensus and the refusal 
of confrontation lead to apathy and disaffection with political participation.” Many observers 
                                                 
 
1 Populism combines anti-elitism with anti-pluralist claims to represent the will of a unified people 
(Mudde 2004). As will become clear below, we are interested in the anti-elite aspect rather than in anti-
pluralism. For this reason, we prefer to use the terms anti-elite party/rhetoric/discourses and only 
occasionally refer to populism to connect to related research. 
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agree that such a ‘vibrant clash’ has largely disappeared from European party systems. This is 
reflected most famously by the cartelization argument of Katz and Mair (1995; 2009), but also 
by findings that many former working-class parties have converged to neoliberal policies 
(Mudge 2011; Schumacher 2012). And indeed, many contributions on the effects of 
polarization (to which we return below) have shown that ideological differences between parties 
generally facilitate citizens’ participation (e.g. Dalton 2008; 2010). In the following sections, 
we argue that a diverse and contested party landscape is particularly important for poor voters.  
However, we are primarily interested here in a particular type of political contestation that goes 
beyond ideological distance: The fundamental rejection of the political mainstream as an 
unresponsive elite, as it is often formulated by populist parties (Mudde 2004; 2013). Such 
discourses, which pit “ordinary people” against the selfish and morally corrupted elite in a 
stylized friend-foe dichotomy, have recently gained salience in most Western democracies 
(Judis 2016; Müller 2016). A well-known contemporary example is Donald Trump’s victorious 
“drain the swamp” campaign. European examples include parties such as Alternative für 
Deutschland, Front National, Movimento 5 Stelle, Podemos, or UKIP. While social problems 
are sometimes discussed as motivations to support such parties (Arzheimer 2009; Golder 2016), 
we are interested in how their discourses influence political engagement among the poor (even 
if they do not vote for them). 
We argue that the emergence or growth of anti-elite mobilization could increase the relative 
internal efficacy of the poor. Concretely, we would expect that anti-elite parties 1) make 
decisions (as well as expressing opinions) easier because they radically simplify political 
questions; 2) emphasize stark differences between parties and thereby illustrate the relevance 
of party choice; 3) translate diffuse frustrations about the political system into concrete 
arguments and demands and thereby restore a sense of political agency; 4) stimulate emotions 
of anger and indignation which typically have a mobilizing effect; and 5) dramatize politics 
with their confrontational style, which could make it more exciting and entertaining for 
relatively disinterested citizens.2  
                                                 
 
2 Another, but less visible, possibility is that anti-elite parties influence perceptions of the political 
system by incentivizing the centre left’s responsiveness to the poor (Anderson and Beramendi 2012). 
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The first two mechanisms link back to the polarization literature. Although they usually do not 
differentiate by income, many studies suggest that polarization makes it is easier for citizens to 
connect their preferences to parties (Dalton 2010; Jansen et al. 2013; Lachat 2008; Lupu 2015) 
and to participate in politics (Dalton 2008; Moral forthcoming; Steiner and Martin 2012; 
Wilford forthcoming; for a critical view see Rogowski 2014). Moreover, it is often argued that 
groups with on average lower political sophistication and attention (such as the poor) benefit 
disproportionately from a diverse and stimulating party system (Dalton 2010; Smidt 2017).3 
Evans and Tilley (2012) show, for instance, that the convergence of British parties has 
coincided with a decline of support for any party that is considerably stronger among low-
income voters. Because anti-elite parties tend to emphasize (or even exaggerate) ideological 
distance to other parties, they might simply facilitate the poor’s political engagement through 
particularly intense polarization so that the poor would have to invest less time and cognitive 
resources to learn about where parties stand (Smidt 2017). Cognitive effort should be further 
reduced, because anti-elite parties often radically simplify political questions, “dichotomizing 
them into black and white and calling for yes or no answers” (Golder 2016: 479). Additionally, 
the easy solutions typically advocated (Moffitt 2015) convey the message that politics is not all 
that complicated. Finally, the portrayal of stark ideological differences might foster an 
impression that party choice actually matters (Immerzeel and Pickup 2015). This could provide 
a motivation to engage with politics despite distraction through material worries. A party system 
with strong anti-elite discourses therefore might facilitate subjective competence among the 
poor to understand politics.  
Our third mechanism rests on the assumption that many poor people experience at least a diffuse 
frustration about politics. This follows from the literature on lacking representation and 
responsiveness cited above. Although this should primarily lead to low external efficacy, it 
could also depress internal efficacy. If the disappointed poor feel they cannot influence politics 
anyway, they probably stop bothering and withdraw from it. This is a plausible reaction, 
because - for the reasons described above - they tend to lack the resources to voice criticism 
and to protest against unresponsive elites. In such a situation, anti-elite parties can help to 
restore a sense of individual agency. Their general attack on elites provides a rhetoric to 
                                                 
 
3 It has to be added, however, that the studies cited above produce inconsistent results in this regard. 
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translate more or less diffuse grievances into concrete criticism (Spruyt et al. 2016). This should 
make it easier for the poor to express what they dislike about politics. That this dislike is shared 
by a visible organization with many supporters should facilitate the feeling that it rests on 
competent and legitimate political attitudes.  
This argument is related to our fourth mechanism on the emotional level. Anti-elite rhetoric 
typically is highly emotional. It often combines anxiety-inducing threats (e.g. the socio-
economic consequences of immigration) with frames that blame irresponsible elites and thereby 
incite anger (Hameleers et al. forthcoming; Moffitt 2015; Mudde 2004). Anger is not only a 
useful coping mechanism for anxious voters, it also is a distinctly mobilizing emotion that is 
associated with increased certainty, optimism, and risk-taking (Lerner and Keltner 2001). 
Importantly, it is linked with greater political news consumption and participation (Valentino 
et al. 2009; 2011). In other words, voters that are responsive to anti-elite parties’ emotionalized 
blame attribution are likely to feel more competent and internally efficacious as a consequence. 
Populists’ externalization of blame could be particularly effective for lower classes that suffer 
from (internalized) stigmatization and a tendency towards self-deprecation (Anduiza et al. 
2016; Spruyt et al. 2016). 
Our fifth and final mechanism refers to the performative dimension of anti-elite politics - or its 
‘entertainment value’. As illustrated best by Donald Trump’s provocative tweeting, the style of 
anti-elite parties is unconventional, confrontational, and often quite spectacular (Moffitt and 
Tormey 2014). The use of simple, colloquial language by charismatic leaders is often combined 
with a calculated violation of conventions and political correctness (Mudde 2004). Although, 
or even because, many voters may dislike this coarse style, it should attract attention - much 
more than quibble about policy details and technocratic language that characterize ‘normal’ 
politics. This entertainment effect of anti-elite rhetoric could be magnified by media reporting, 
which is biased in favor of the spectacular (Hameleers et al. forthcoming; Mudde 2004; 
Rooduijn 2014). Again, this additional motivation through excitement should 
disproportionately benefit previously disengaged groups such as the poor.   
Based on these mechanisms, we expect that anti-elite rhetoric boosts internal efficacy of the 
poor. Two clarifications are in order. First, while mechanisms three and four apply to 
supporters, the other three are also relevant for non-supporters. Polarization, simplification, and 
excitement should even benefit voters who emphatically dislike anti-elite parties. We therefore 
think it is appropriate to study the salience of anti-elite rhetoric on the level of party systems.  
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Hypothesis 2: The gap in internal efficacy between the poor and other income groups is smaller 
in party systems characterized by pronounced anti-elite rhetoric. 
The second clarification concerns citizens with higher incomes. Our main argument underlying 
Hypothesis 2 is about poor citizens, because we expect mobilization through anti-elite rhetoric 
to be stronger in this relatively inattentive income group. But it could also be that anti-elite 
rhetoric has the opposite effect on better-off citizens (which would contribute to reducing 
income inequality in internal efficacy). Middle and high incomes probably feel more 
comfortable with a centrist political consensus as well as with the policy output and socio-
economic outcomes it produces. Anti-elite mobilization then might appear as a challenge of 
their privilege and as a disruptive attack on their taken-for-granted understanding of politics. 
This should be the case in particular for voters who identify with the attacked elite (which often 
also includes cultural, financial, or academic elites). Overall, we can expect that many better-
off citizens feel insecure about what is the best political approach in a party landscape 
fundamentally changed by anti-elite parties. Without being able to theorize this aspect in detail 
here, we find it plausible that anti-elite rhetoric could also reduce the income-efficacy gap by 
depressing the internal efficacy of higher income groups.  
INCOME, EFFICACY, AND ANTI-ELITE SALIENCE IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE  
Data and methodology 
We have argued that poor voters suffer from reduced internal efficacy and that anti-elite rhetoric 
may offset this effect. Our first study explores this relationship cross-nationally. This requires 
individual level data for income and internal efficacy as well as a measure for anti-elite 
discourses in the respective party systems. For the individual level we use the European Social 
Service (ESS). The second aspect is more difficult to operationalize, because there is no agreed-
upon indicator for anti-elitism in party systems that would allow large cross-national 
comparisons (Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017). Fortunately, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
(CHES) has recently made an effort to fill this gap by including a variable on the salience of 
anti-elite rhetoric on the party level (see Polk et al. 2017 for details and validation of the 
measure). This indicator is only available for 2014, which restricts us to the most recent ESS 
wave collected in the same year. Both surveys jointly cover 17 countries (Figure 1) and 25792 
individuals. A full discussion of data sources and summary statistics can be found in the 
appendix. 
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Our dependent variable is respondents’ internal efficacy. It is constructed as an additive index 
based on three items capturing respondents’ confidence in their ability to understand and 
participate in politics (Crombach α= 0.84, see appendix for question wording and construction). 
The index ranges between 0 and 10, where higher values indicate a greater sense of internal 
efficacy. The explanatory variable is respondents’ household after-tax income. The ESS places 
all respondents into country-specific income deciles, which we recoded into low (deciles 1-3), 
middle (4-7), and high income (8-10). This is a rather broad definition of poverty, but our results 
are robust to alternative specifications such as focusing on the difference between lowest decile 
and median income or if we treat income as a linear variable (see Appendix Tables 7 and 8).  
To capture the intensity of anti-elite discourses in the political system, we rely on the CHES, 
which asks national experts to rate the “salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric” 
for each party. Salience scores range from 0 (low) to 10 (high). This measure is extremely useful 
for us, because it allows us to go beyond a dichotomous party family approach (which would 
produce little variation in contemporary Europe) and to operationalize anti-elite rhetoric as a 
continuous phenomenon. However, the translation of these party scores into party system 
characteristics requires an important analytical choice. On the one hand, we could use the 
maximum value among parties that gained a seat in the national parliament. This indicator 
captures the intensity of anti-elite rhetoric. However, by ignoring electoral performance, it does 
not consider the relative success of anti-elite parties. On the other hand, we could use the vote 
share of anti-elite parties (which we define as being above 75th percentile4 in anti-elite salience). 
This indicator does take into-account relative success, but cannot account for variations in 
intensity and is sensitive to the selection of the cut-off point. Which indicator is more 
appropriate cannot be decided a priori, as this would require a theory about whether electoral 
relevance or intensity of anti-elite discourses matter more, an aspect we are agnostic about. 
Fortunately, both indicators are correlated and produce virtually the same results (See Figure 1 
and 2 as well as Appendix Table 10). For the main analysis, we rely on vote share of anti-elite 
parties.  
                                                 
 
4 This cutoff excludes the Dansk Folkeparti (DF), which is just below the value but usually considered 
an anti-elite party. However, using a lower cut-off point that includes DF does not change our results 
(see Appendix Table 9)  
 11 
Ideally, we would complement our party-system indicators with information on how salient 
anti-elite sentiments are in broader public discourses (e.g. in the media, Rooduijn 2014), but to 
our knowledge there is no readily available comparative indicator for this aspect. 
 
Figure 1: Maximum anti-elite score in parliament and vote share of anti-elite parties (2014)
 
Note: based on CHES (Polk et al. 2017). Labeled with country codes and party with max. anti-elite score in 
parliament. Party abbreviations: CDU=Unitary Democratic Coalition, DF=Danish People’s Party, DK=Way of 
Courage, FN=National Front, FPÖ=Austrian Freedom Party, GREEN=Green Party, JOBBIK=Movement for a 
Better Hungary, LINKE=The Left, OLaNO=Ordinary People, PBP=People Before Profit, PS=True Finns, 
PVV=Freedom Party, PiS=Law and Justice, SD=Sweden Democrats, UPyD=Union, Progress and Democracy, 
USVIT=Dawn, VB=Flemish Interest. 
 
All individual-level control variables are taken directly from the ESS. We prefer a parsimonious 
model and therefore include only the main socio-economic controls that have been found to 
matter for internal efficacy: respondents’ main activity in the last seven days, gender, and years 
of education. Other political orientations and membership in political organizations obviously 
do influence efficacy as well (Marx and Nguyen 2016). But based on our theory these factors 
should mediate rather than confound the effect of low income. That said, our results remain 
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unchanged if we also control for ideology, party affiliation, religiosity, and trade union 
membership (Appendix Table 6).  
Given our nested data structure, we use a multi-level random intercept model. With only 17 
countries, we are restricted regarding the number of macro control variables. We control for 
post-communist countries with their less mature democracies and different party-system 
dynamics (which are already illustrated by Figure 1). We also control for the effective number 
of political parties, because the availability of alternatives might be a separate mechanism 
facilitating or complicating party choice (Wilford forthcoming). The number of parties should 
also pick up differences in electoral systems. Finally, we include income inequality within the 
country (Gini coefficient). This variable captures efforts of the welfare state to support the poor, 
which could be beneficial for their political involvement (Iversen and Soskice 2015; Marx and 
Nguyen 2016). Inequality should also affect the political salience of income differences.  
Results  
Table 1 reports the results of three hierarchical random-intercept models. To facilitate 
comparisons between coefficients, we mean-center all continuous explanatory variables and 
divided them by two standard deviations. The coefficient estimates for continuous variables 
now represent a movement of one standard deviation, and can be compared directly to the 
coefficients of binary and factor variables (Gelman, 2008). 
Table 1: Income, Anti-Elite Salience and Internal Efficacy 
 
1: Individual 
Level 
2:Country 
Characteristics 
3:Cross-Level 
Interactions 
Household Income - Ref: Medium     
     Low -0.51*** -0.51*** -0.51*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
     High 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Cross-Level Interactions        
     Anti-Elite Vote Share  -0.27 -0.27 
  (0.34) (0.34) 
     Anti-Elite Vote Share x   
     Low Income 
  0.13* 
   (0.06) 
     Anti-Elite Vote Share x  
     High Income 
  -0.15* 
   (0.07) 
Main Activity - Ref: Paid Employment     
     Education 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 
 13 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
     Unemployed -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
     Inactive -0.31** -0.31** -0.31** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
     Sick or Disabled -0.45*** -0.45*** -0.45*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
     Retired -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.34*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
     Military Service -0.43 -0.43 -0.44 
 (0.82) (0.82) (0.82) 
     Housework -0.38*** -0.38*** -0.38*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Socio-Economic Controls     
     Age -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
     Female -0.57*** -0.57*** -0.58*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
     Years of Education 0.63*** 0.63*** 0.63*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Country Characteristics     
     Post-Communist  -1.09** -1.08** 
  (0.38) (0.37) 
     Effective Number of  
    Parties 
 -0.01 -0.02 
  (0.31) (0.30) 
     Gini  -0.47 -0.47 
  (0.31) (0.31) 
Intercept 3.80*** 3.87*** 3.87*** 
 (0.19) (0.14) (0.14) 
AIC 113100.97 113095.74 113092.36 
BIC 113223.34 113250.74 113263.68 
Log Likelihood -56535.49 -56528.87 -56525.18 
Num. Individuals 25792 25792 25792 
Num. Countries  17 17 17 
Var: Country (Intercept) 0.63 0.31 0.30 
Var: Residual 4.67 4.67 4.67 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05,  
 
The first model controls for individual characteristics, the second model adds country level 
controls, while the third model also includes cross-level interactions. The findings reported in 
Table 1 support our hypotheses. Income has a consistent and statistically significant effect on 
internal efficacy. Compared to medium income respondents, low-income respondents exhibit 
lower internal efficacy, while high-income respondents have, on average, a higher level of 
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internal efficacy. Moving from the middle to the lower end of the income distribution is 
associated with reductions in internal efficacy similar to the difference between men and 
women or moving from full-time employment to being sick and disabled. Adding country 
variables improves the model fit considerably.5 A legacy of communism is associated with a 
sizable reduction in internal efficacy. However, neither inequality, anti-elite salience, nor the 
number of parties appear to have a significant direct effect on efficacy.  
Figure 2: Marginal Effect of Low Income given Anti-Elite Salience / Polarization 
 
 
More importantly, however, both Table 1 and Figure 2 support Hypothesis 2: anti-elite salience 
does reduce the effect of low income on efficacy. All other things being equal, the effect of 
moving from medium to poor income in Austria (where the anti-elite FPO and Team Stronach 
                                                 
 
5 The interclass-correlation of the empty model is 0.125, so differences in country characteristics explain 
about 12% of differences in internal efficacy. Including country characteristics reduces the variance at 
level 2 by roughly 50%. The empty model specification is reported in Appendix Table 4 
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had a combined vote share of 26.2 %) is approximately 35% less severe than in Germany (where 
the AfD and the NPD combined captured less than 5% of the vote share). However, while 
Figure 2 shows that anti-elite salience is associated with a considerable reduction of the income 
gap in efficacy, the gap is not closed entirely. 
As we demonstrate in more detail in the Appendix (Appendix Tables 11 and12), the results do 
not seem to depend on our operationalization of anti-elite salience. Panel B of Figure 2 shows 
that results do not change if we instead use the maximum anti-elite score in parliament. Because 
our argument partly rests on a more polarized party landscape, we also replicate the analysis 
with an interaction of income and two polarization indicators: an updated version of Dalton’s 
(2008) measure of the perceived left-right party system polarization and a measure of party 
platform polarization (Finseraas and Vernby 2011). Both show a similar moderation pattern 
and confirm our expectation that income gaps in efficacy become smaller in more polarized 
party systems (Panel C and D in Figure 2). 
In short, there is evidence that party-system differences moderate the effect of income on 
internal efficacy. While these patterns are suggestive, it is difficult to base firm conclusions on 
them at this stage. Both, income and anti-elite salience are likely correlated with potentially 
relevant factors we cannot account for in our model. Moreover, a purely cross-sectional 
approach cannot establish temporality, making causal inference difficult. Iversen and Soskice 
(2015) argue, for instance, in contrast to our theory, that polarization is the consequence of more 
politically knowledgeable lower-class voters. In the two following studies, we therefore provide 
additional evidence that helps us to isolate the causal effect of exposure to anti-elite rhetoric on 
internal efficacy.  
PRIMING ANTI-ELITE RHETORIC IN A SURVEY EXPERIMENT  
We have argued that anti-elite rhetoric can increase internal efficacy of lower income voters. 
While the results of the previous study support this hypothesis, the observational nature of the 
data does not allow for a more causal interpretation. To address this shortcoming, we designed 
an experiment embedded in a representative survey of the German population. Germany is a 
suitable case, because it recently experienced an intense growth of anti-elite mobilization. As 
shown in Figure 1, it had one of the lowest anti-elite score in our 2014 sample. Die Linke was 
the most radical party in parliament with a very moderate anti-elite salience score 5.4, while the 
more extreme anti-elite parties only gained 5.4% of the vote share. However, this changed 
dramatically in recent years because of the emergence of Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a 
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new radical right wing party. The AfD was founded in 2013 as a protest party against bail-outs 
of Eurozone countries and barely missed the five-percent threshold to enter parliament in the 
2013 national election. Although the turn to a radical anti-immigration platform occurred later 
(after a party split), the 2014 CHES already assigns an anti-elite score of 7.8 to the AfD. Since 
2015, it polls comfortably above the electoral threshold and will most likely enter parliament 
in the 2017 elections. The recency of intense anti-elite mobilization and the fact that AfD is not 
yet represented in parliament is advantageous for our analysis. Because voters have not yet 
grown accustomed to (or weary of) anti-elite frames, we have a chance to experimentally prime 
a real-world discourse that has not yet unfolded its full effect on the baseline efficacy of poor 
voters (as would probably be the case in party systems with more established anti-elite parties).  
Data and methodology 
Around 1200 computer-assisted web interviews of the target group between 18 and 65 years 
were conducted by YouGov in Feburary 2017. The goal of the experiment was to assess the 
causal influence of anti-elite rhetoric on internal political efficacy. To this end, we conducted a 
simple priming experiment that randomly exposed respondents to anti-elite statements. All 
participants received a standard question measuring internal efficacy (“How confident are you 
in your own ability to participate in politics?” with answer options ranging from 0 “Not at all 
confident” to 10 “Completely confident”). The treatment group was asked before to respond to 
the following three items that were designed to resemble typical anti-elite rhetoric:  
 1) “Political parties often spread lies to get elected” 
2) “Politicians are more interested in their careers than in the good of the country” 
3) “Politicians in Berlin have abandoned ordinary people” 
While the statements certainly formulate blunt criticisms, they are not more extreme than the 
typical accusations of anti-elite parties. We deliberately refrain from pointing to criminal 
offenses, such as corruption, and believe that the statements could be easily encountered in a 
German pub or other places where politics are discussed. To avoid conflation of anti-elite 
sentiments with priming ideology, we excluded messages that explicitly focus on concrete 
issues such as immigration. As such, the treatment is not designed to provide any new 
information, but merely to prime anti-elite criticism and thereby to activate it as a salient 
interpretative frame for thinking about politics. According to our theory, low-income 
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participants should feel more internally efficacious if they apply this interpretative frame to 
politics. 
The case numbers do not allow a fine-grained analysis of income differences. We use a rough 
income measure and divide respondents into two groups below and above a threshold of 2500 
Euros as net monthly household income. After list-wise deletion of missing values, we have 
487 respondents below the threshold (245 treated) and 411 above (208 treated). Our analysis 
consists of comparing means and confidence intervals of the four groups that result from our 
design (Figure 3). 
Results 
Figure 3: Internal efficacy by anti-elite prime and income 
 
The patterns in the control group confirm what we observed in the previous study based on ESS 
data. Respondents in the bottom half of the income distribution express on average considerably 
lower internal efficacy (the mean is 5.2 compared to 6.3 in the upper half). This difference 
virtually disappears, however, once respondents are exposed to an anti-elite frame. This 
happens because the treatment is, as expected, associated with significantly higher internal 
efficacy in the bottom half (in which the difference between control and treated group is 0.72, 
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p=.003). Given that internal efficacy is often thought of as being rooted in rather stable 
characteristics, this is not a small effect. In a more narrowly defined low-income group below 
1500 EUR (not shown) the treatment effect is 0.78 with p=.015. At the same time, the anti-elite 
prime causes the opposite effect among respondents with higher income (-0.35). However, this 
effect is not statistically significant (p=.128). Hence, the results are exactly what we would 
expect based on our theory. 
DOES ANTI-ELITE SALIENCE REDUCE INEQUALITY IN POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION? 
Our observational and experimental data suggest that anti-elite parties can strengthen the 
internal political efficacy of poorer voters. But we cannot necessarily assume that this directly 
translates into higher participation. Attitudes might be more responsive than actual behaviors. 
And even if beneficial for internal efficacy, anti-elite parties could weaken other prerequisites 
for political participation (Immerzeel and Pickup 2015; Rooduijn et al. 2016). We therefore 
briefly address the issue of political participation of the poor, without claiming to give full 
justice to this important point.  
To this end, we simply reproduce the ESS analysis presented above with two new dependent 
variables: self-reported participation in the last national election and an index of alternative, 
non-electoral forms of participation. The latter captures additively whether or not respondents 
engaged in the following activities in the last 12 month: worn a campaign badge, signed a 
petition, contacted a political official, worked in a political party or action group, or participated 
in a public demonstration. The indicator increases by one for each activity, so that it ranges 
from zero to five.   
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Figure 4: Marginal Effect of Low Income given vote share of anti-elite parties  
 
Table 2: Income, Anti-Elite Salience and Political Involvement 
 Voting 
Other Political 
Participation 
Household Income - Ref: Medium     
     Low -0.26*** -0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
     High 0.28*** 0.15*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) 
Cross-Level Interactions      
     Anti-Elite Vote Share -0.26 -0.07 
 (0.14) (0.09) 
     Anti-Elite Vote Share x   
     Low Income 0.01 0.10
*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) 
     Anti-Elite Vote Share x   
    High Income 0.09 -0.03 
 (0.05) (0.03) 
    Additional Controls Omitted      
AIC 24080.60 73083.90 
BIC 24243.28 73255.99 
Log Likelihood -12020.30 -36520.95 
Num. Individuals 25181 26766 
Num. Countries  17 17 
Var: Country (Intercept) 0.05 0.02 
Var: Residual  0.89 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
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Table 2 and Figure 4 summarize the relationship between poverty, anti-elite salience, and 
political participation. Again, all continuous independent variables have been standardized (full 
models can be found in the appendix). As expected, poor voters are less likely to participate in 
elections or in other ways. However, the moderating role of anti-elite salience is ambiguous. 
With regards to voting, we do not find a statistically significant moderation effect. As Panel A 
in Figure 4 shows, poor citizens’ lower probability to vote remains constant across party 
systems. Poorer citizens do, however, benefit from the presence of anti-elite parties when it 
comes to other forms of political participation. As Panel B shows, poor respondents do no 
longer show significantly reduced participation if anti-elite parties reach about 25 per cent of 
the vote in a country.  
How can we make sense of these inconsistent findings? First, we cannot rule out that the non-
finding for voting results from systematic measurement error. Self-reported voting is usually 
inflated by social-desirability bias (Selb and Munzert 2013), a problem that might be 
exacerbated by the retrospective ESS question and the varying time gap between survey and 
last election. Indeed, a comparison with actual turnout (in the appendix) reveals strong over-
reporting of voting in the ESS, which could artificially dampen the income gradient (Erikson 
2015). Because unconventional forms of participation are less of a ‘civic duty’ and because the 
question refers to the past 12 months, social desirability and recall bias might be less severe. 
But there also is a possible substantive interpretation of the non-result for voting. It is rather 
plausible that anti-elite salience might undermine other aspects of political involvement than 
internal efficacy, namely external political efficacy and political trust (Rooduijn et al. 2016). 
Anti-elite parties might draw support from previous non-voters and thereby increase 
participation in elections. However, if they contribute to eroding external efficacy among voters 
who, for one reason or another, are not inclined to support a radical party, this could also reduce 
electoral participation. Our argument implies that some voters gain relative internal efficacy 
because of simplified and dramatized competition between elites and populist challengers. It is 
not difficult to imagine, however, that some of these voters are disgusted and alienated from 
this competition (Rogowski 2014). Particularly if the anti-elite party is not an option (because 
of fundamental disagreement about values, political socialization, social desirability, conflict 
aversion, or disappointment with the party’s performance), intense anti-elite discourses might 
leave no trustworthy political actor in the electoral arena to turn to. From this perspective, there 
is no theoretical reason why internal and external efficacy as well as electoral and 
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unconventional participation would have to react in the same way to anti-elite rhetoric. 
Unbundling these processes is a fascinating and important task for future research. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this article, we have developed and tested a novel argument according to which internal 
efficacy is an important component of the lower political engagement of poor citizens. 
Moreover, we have argued that anti-elite rhetoric counters the negative effect of poverty on 
internal efficacy. We have shown that the salience of anti-elite rhetoric on the party-system 
level robustly correlates with the size of the efficacy gap between poor and non-poor voters. 
This relationship is not simply correlational. Using a representative survey experiment, we 
demonstrate that random exposure to anti-elite statements significantly increases internal 
efficacy of lower-income respondents. While both approaches have limitations, their joint 
evidence lends strong support to two conclusions. Poverty tends to reduce internal political 
efficacy: and anti-elite rhetoric tends to reduce the gap between the poor and the rich. 
What are the broader implications of this observation? Despite our findings for internal efficacy, 
we are hesitant to endorse the proliferation of anti-elite parties as a means for reducing political 
inequality. As we have shown, it is not clear whether higher efficacy does actually lower the 
income gradient in voting, even if this seems to be the case for other forms of participation. We 
could only deal with this important aspect in passing and hope that future research will return 
to it with more suitable data.  
If we assume for a moment that the lower efficacy gap we observed does translate into more 
equal participation in elections, what would be the political implications? Could anti-elite 
parties possibly contribute to breaking the vicious cycle of unequal participation and unequal 
representation? Can anti-elite parties contribute to policy change that reflects the interest of the 
poor (or, more accurately, what we interpret as their interests)? This would be possible through 
two mechanisms that could be studied empirically: directly, through mobilizing poor voters 
who increase the coalition in favor of redistribution and welfare state generosity. And indirectly, 
by forcing center-left parties to compete for lower-income voters and thereby incentivizing a 
better representation of this group. 
But there are also reasons to be skeptical. Policy advances for the poor are particularly 
questionable in the case of radical right-wing parties, whose ideology dictates excluding some 
of the most vulnerable groups in society. While many right-wing parties project a pro-welfare 
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image, they often advocate cuts in programs with a reputation of benefiting immigrants (e.g. 
social assistance, child benefits). Such ‘welfare chauvinism’ can actually harm poor natives as 
well. Hence, anti-elite salience is but one feature of a party and we cannot assess its broader 
impact without looking at the entire profile. Future research should therefore contextualize our 
findings by including the specific ideology of anti-elite parties as well as the programmatic 
response of the mainstream.   
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